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After the Great Depression and throughout the rest of the twentieth century, Latin 
American countries basically approached economic development following two 
successive and quite opposed strategies. The first one was import substitution 
industrialization. The second was the so-called Washington Consensus approach. While 
the two views were founded on quite opposite premises, neither the import substitution 
industrialization nor the Washington Consensus managed to deliver sustained economic 
development to Latin American countries. Two domestic elements are crucial to 
understand this outcome. One is the failure of the state. The second is the inability to 
achieve mature integration into the world economy. 
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Introduction 
The relevance of economic growth for social welfare cannot be underestimated. Even if 
the starting point is not rather different, as was the case for most economies before the 
Industrial Revolution, small differences in growth rates will generate in the long run 
quite divergent outcomes. Indeed, it is a fact that country differences in per capita 
incomes have been growing through time. Likewise, the gap between rich countries and 
the ones that remain poor has deepened.  
 
Economic growth depends on capital accumulation, both physical and human, as well as 
on the evolution of total factor productivity (TFP). Several economic variables, such as 
present and expected profits, interest rates, investment risks, R&D and entrepreneurship, 
among others, do affect capital accumulation and TFP. However, social equity, 
including a fair income distribution, and the working of the institutional framework 
have been increasingly acknowledged as key determinants of economic growth, not 
only because they affect the non-idiosyncratic risks of investment, but also because they 
can promote or discourage entrepreneurship, innovation and technological progress. 
 
The dismal long run performance of Latin American (LATAM) economies since the 
end of the Second World War (despite differences in initial conditions and other country 
specificities) brings nevertheless an excellent opportunity to try to understand why 
economic growth and development can be so elusive. Consequently, the main purpose 
of the paper is to establish the stylized facts of economic development in Latin America 
in the post war time and to identify a few common factors underlying the rather poor 
outcomes achieved, no matter how different the development strategies implemented 
throughout this period were. To do so, the paper is organized into four sections. The 
first briefly discusses the long-run economic performance of the region since the Great 
Depression from a comparative perspective. The second presents the stylized facts of 
the import substitution industrialization (ISI) period, trying to identify the main reasons 
of its failure. The third section does the same with the more recent period of market-
friendly reforms. Finally, the last section concludes with some general remarks and a 
few comments on were LATAM countries stand now. 
1  Different strategies, common weaknesses 
There is little doubt that the long-run economic performance of LATAM countries in 
the past 70 years or so, especially in comparative terms, has been rather disappointing. 
While different countries experienced more or less extended periods of improving 
economic conditions and rapid expansion at different times, sustained growth proved 
unattainable for the region as a whole. Not only were LATAM countries ineffective in 
closing the income gap with the developed world (as a matter of fact the gap widened), 
they were also left far behind by several developing counties belonging to other regions   2
of the world, which showed similar or even worse initial conditions than the ones 
prevailing in Latin America. In particular, the contrast with the ‘Asian Tigers’ is 
remarkably striking.1 As illustrated in Figure 1, at the beginning of the 1960s the Tigers 
had on average a much lower per capita income than most LATAM countries. 
Nowadays, however, they show much better outcomes not only on per capita GDP, but 
also on income distribution and poverty indicators.  













Note: 17 OECD rich: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. 
LATAM: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. Asian Tigers: South 
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia.  
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Maddison (2003). 
 
After the Great Depression in the early part of twentieth century and throughout the rest 
of the century, LATAM countries basically approached economic development 
following two successive and quite opposed strategies. The first approach was import 
substitution industrialization. While it initially appeared as a defensive response to the 
world crisis that put an end to the gold standard regime and reduced multilateral trade to 
minimum levels, industrialization based on import substitution and an interventionist 
state became a fully fledged strategy after the Second World War. The debt crisis of the 
early 1980s made the inherent shortcomings of the LATAM version of the ISI strategy 
quite evident. As a result, in the second half of the decade an alternative approach 
gradually emerged. Its advocates stressed that this new approach, unlike the previous 
one, was market-friendly and consistent with the ongoing process of globalization 
experienced by the world economy. Because of the support of the USA, the only 
remaining superpower after the fall of the Berlin Wall, as well as the international 
financial institutions (IFIs) based in Washington DC, the market-friendly approach 
became known as the ‘Washington Consensus’. In spite of the fact that the two 
                                                 
1 The Asian Tigers include the following countries: South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
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approaches were founded on quite opposite premises, neither the ISI nor the 
Washington Consensus managed to deliver sustained economic development to 
LATAM countries.  
 
After the Second World War, the Asian Tigers also adopted ISI led by an interventionist 
state, but from the mid 1960s or so they managed to gradually shift towards an outward-
oriented development strategy based on fast export growth and a rather adequate 
balance between market forces and state intervention. This was made possible by a 
combination of factors. First, political stability which enabled the adoption of sound 
macroeconomic policies, including fiscal discipline, and kept inflation rates at low 
levels. Second, a state strong enough to put into place not only effective incentives, 
including a competitive exchange rate and export promoting policies, but also heavy 
penalties on private firms when targets were not fulfilled. Third, a high domestic 
savings rate that helped sustain a significant investment effort without inducing external 
vulnerabilities. Needless to say, all such factors have been so far completely absent in 
Latin America. Moreover, the Asian Tigers combined fast growth with improving 
income distribution. Land reform and public investment in human capital, missing or 
weak in Latin America, played an important role in this regard.  
 
The Chilean experience of the last 20 years is, to some extent, the regional exception 
that confirms the rule. In this period the country attained fast growth and was able to 
significantly reduce poverty (Figure 2). However, the high level of social inequality still 
needs to be sharply reduced and its productive structure has yet to overcome several 
weaknesses for Chile to join the club of countries undergoing sustained socioeconomic 
evelopment (Figure 3).  











Source: Author’s elaboration based on ECLAC database on social indicators. 
 
In our view, two common factors are crucial to understand the successive failure of both 
the ISI and Washington Consensus approaches, despite their contrasts. On the one hand 
the failure of the state to fulfill its role. Indeed, governments were unable to deliver the 
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of the two strategies. On the other hand, excessive protectionism under ISI and 
unrestrained liberalization during the Washington Consensus period prevented Latin 
America from achieving a fruitful integration into the world economy. They also made 
the region extremely vulnerable to external disturbances which were common to both 
periods, albeit for different reasons—terms of trade shocks until the late 1970s, both 
real and (mainly) financial shocks afterwards. 











Note: QV and QI are the income averages of the fifth and first quintiles respectively. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on WIID database (www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm, version 2.0a, 
June 2005). 
2  The ISI period  
With the outbreak of the worldwide economic depression that followed the collapse in 
share prices on the USA stock market in October 1929, the world economic context 
changed radically. The sharp decline in USA economic activity spread to European 
countries and, as a result of the large drop in effective demand in the advanced 
economies, international trade fell dramatically, decreasing approximately 30 per cent 
during 1929-32. Meanwhile, many countries sought to ease their balance of payments 
difficulties by devaluing their respective currencies, thus undermining the gold standard. 
This, in turn, accentuated the decline in trade flows and triggered similar protectionist 
reactions in other countries. The approach of Latin American countries regarding their 
integration into the world economy was modified by this new scenario. The 
‘comparative advantages’ paradigm, based on the exchange of raw materials for 
manufactured products, was no longer useful for peripheral countries. In the same way, 
the decline in the terms of trade imposed several problems in the external accounts of 
the balance of payments. The natural response of LATAM countries was to elevate 
import tariffs and to impose exchange controls in order to restore the equilibrium in the 
external accounts.  
 
The new protectionist policies provided domestic industrial sectors with an opportunity 
for expansion. Nevertheless, this was not the result of a deliberate strategy aimed at 













1970s 1990s or 2000s  5
a defensive reaction adopted by governments in light of the new global economic 
scenario. Moreover, the outbreak of the Second World War in the late 1930s, with the 
natural protection it provided, implied an extra push to incipient industrialization. 
Nonetheless, after the end of the war import substitution industrialization was adopted 
as a deliberate policy option by many governments, not only in LATAM countries but 
also in East and South East Asia. During the early stages of the ISI strategy in Latin 
America, import substitution made fast progress in the so-called light industries, 
manufacturing consumer goods. In fact, their share in total imports declined sharply. 
However, the ‘easy’ phase of the ISI, far from substituting domestic production for 
aggregate imports, tended to replace imports of consumer goods with those of inputs 
and capital goods necessary to sustain the process of industrialization.2 On the other 
hand, availability of the foreign exchange required to pay for these vital imports 
remained highly dependant on primary exports and, therefore, subject to the extreme 
volatility of the international prices of commodities. The outcome of this strategy was 
rather closed economies in which firms focused almost exclusively on protected 
domestic markets. In Figure 4 we can see the trade ratios of LATAM countries for the 
1960s and 1970s, when the ISI strategy was consolidated: they were not only low but, in 
most cases, showed a declining trend. Even Chile, the country with the highest ratio in 
the sample (around 30 per cent of GDP), was quite closed in international terms.  








Source: Author’s elaboration based on ECLAC database.  
 
In many countries the adoption of the ISI strategy was the result of the hegemonic 
position of the military which, in repeated occasions, even ruled the countries for 
prolonged periods. In fact, the ideology prevailing in the region’s armed forces 
considered industrialization as a necessary step towards ‘economic independence’ and 
national autonomy. An active role of the state was also thought crucial to further 
stimulate this process, particularly regarding the production of war material. As 
industrialization went on, however, it became more and more reliant on imports of 
                                                 


























































1960s 1970s  6
intermediate inputs and capital goods. In a context of stagnant exports the natural 
consequence was recurrent balance of payments crises that imposed a stop-and-go 
pattern to the economic performance of LATAM countries. Import dependence and the 
stop-and-go nature of the business cycle became more evident in the larger economies 
of the region, where industrialization reached the so-called heavy industries. In these 
sectors, moreover, the optimal minimum scales of industrial plants are usually bigger 
and the costs of inefficiencies arising from operating below such levels are more severe. 
Although industrialization in the Asian Tigers was also initially based on import 
substitution, in the late 1960s and early 1970s its path started to diverge from the one 
followed by LATAM countries. Basically, the fact that the Tigers were not able to 
generate enough foreign currency through their exports of primary goods, as was the 
case of most LATAM economies, forced them to adopt export-oriented industrialization 
strategies (Oman and Wignaraja 1991). 
 
Nevertheless, this change did not imply a weakening in the role played by the state in 
the allocation of resources. Basically, domestic markets remained protected and 
financing continued to be heavily subsidised. The main difference with LATAM 
countries was the capacity of the government to discipline domestic industries by means 
of export targets, government supervision and credible time limits to protectionist 
policies, in order to make their production more efficient and competitive in foreign 
markets.3 In addition to this, the macroeconomic context was substantially different in 
both regions. Although state economic interventionism was a common feature of both 
experiences, in the case of the Asian Tigers this was combined with sound 
macroeconomic policies that resulted in robust public finances, low levels of inflation, 
and less volatility. The combination of an adequate mix of policy incentives (‘sticks and 
carrots’) and a stable macro environment was key in order to provide the private firms 
the right business climate required for allocating their resources in productive activities 
and planning longer term investments projects. 
 
That was not the case in LATAM countries. Despite extreme protectionism and 
significant subsidies (both in terms of export drawbacks and financing with negative 
real interest rates), the industrial sector never became a mature and internationally 
competitive sector. A closed economic environment, the politically biased management 
of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the pervasiveness of unfair regulations favouring 
the interests of small but powerful groups, led to a context where rent-seeking behaviour 
tended to prevail over entrepreneurship (Krueger 1990). Moreover, political populism 
was the main resort by which governments in the region attempted to manage social 
conflicts and income distribution. Rent seeking and political populism caused the public 
                                                 
3 As a picturesque example of the disciplinary power of the state in East Asia, we can mention the case of 
Park’s dictatorship in Korea. Shortly after taking power, he imprisoned the principal businessmen of his 
country, accusing them of having illegally enriched themselves during the previous regime. Even though 
they were set free shortly afterwards, this only occurred after these businessmen committed themselves to 
carrying out specific investments requested by Park. See Rodrik (1995); also Amsden (1996).   7
sector to display chronic fiscal deficits which were basically financed by printing 
money. As a result, since the mid 1960s LATAM countries performed much worse than 
the Asian Tigers both in terms of inflation (Figure 5) and long-run economic growth 
(Figure 6). 







                                        Source: Own elaboration based on IMF Statistics. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on IMF statistics. 








Source: Author’s elaboration based on Maddison (2003). 
 
The contrasting economic performance of Latin America and East Asia suggests that the 
ISI failure in most of Latin America has less to do with its alleged inherent weaknesses 
than with its inadequate implementation (Rodrik 2003). True enough, Latin America as 
a whole did grow faster between 1930 and 1975 than in any previous or subsequent 
period of its history. Furthermore, industrial exports began to expand in the mid 1960s 
in some of the largest LATAM economies.4 Mexico and Brazil, in particular, did quite 
                                                 
4 In any case, already in the mid 1980s, the share of manufactured exports in the total remained much 
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well throughout the period.5 Moreover, in most countries economic growth was 
accompanied by significant progress on income distribution. These improvements, 
however, were almost exclusively based on direct subsidies, tax deductions and 
subsidized credit at negative real interest rates, mainly financed with the surpluses of the 
pay-as-you-go pension systems and the inflation tax. In sum, the ISI model 
implemented in LATAM countries proved unsustainable in the long run. Their 
limitations became more severe throughout the 1970s, as fiscal imbalances increased, 
inflation rates accelerated and economic activity tended to deteriorate pari passu with 
the worsening of external conditions arising from the oil shocks at the beginning and 
end of the decade.  
 
External difficulties notwithstanding, two domestic elements are crucial to understand 
the breakdown of the ISI strategy in Latin America. One was the failure of the state to 
work as an engine of growth. The large inefficiencies of SOEs and the government’s 
inability to appropriately combine the subsidies granted to private firms with suitable 
controls and penalties in case of their improper use, not only induced chronic fiscal 
deficits and short-run macro instability, but undermined overall productivity and long-
run growth as well. Populist redistributive policies, moreover, heightened fiscal 
imbalances while, at the same time, impinged on the returns of the most productive 
economic sectors.  
 
The second factor was the extremely inward orientation of industrialization induced by 
extended and protracted protectionism, which prevented LATAM economies from 
taking advantage of foreign markets as a disciplining device to gradually enhance the 
competitiveness of domestic firms. The indefinite postponement of the economy’s 
opening to foreign competition kept domestic markets mostly in the hands of 
oligopolistic firms with fewer incentives to enhance productivity than to preserve their 
market shares by resorting to rent-seeking practices. Moreover, protectionist policies 
crystallized a structure of relative prices with a strong anti-export bias, particularly 
harming tradable sectors. As the failure of the ISI strategy became more evident, there 
was a change in the conventional wisdom about what the developing countries should 
do in order to reach sustainable development. Nevertheless, the easy availability of 
financing in international markets, mainly as a consequence of the surpluses in OPEC 
countries, made it possible to postpone the inevitable economic adjustments. 
 
At last, in the late 1970s, several LATAM countries launched programmes of economic 
reforms tending to reduce inflation, overcome external constraints and resume growth 
by increasing the openness of the economy and reducing the involvement of the State in 
the economy. The programmes implemented in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay were the 
more ambitious: they combined drastic trade and financial liberalization with severe 
cuts in public expenditures and a preannounced schedule of nominal exchange rate 
                                                 
5 Indeed, Brazil was among the fastest growing economies in the world.   9
devaluation to curb price volatility. Inertial inflation arising from formal and informal 
practices of price indexation, however, resulted in the overvaluation of domestic 
currencies, large trade imbalances, an upsurge in foreign debt (both public and private) 
and, particularly in the case of Argentina, huge fiscal imbalances. The so-called 
Southern Cone liberalization attempts ended abruptly in the early 1980s, in the midst of 
simultaneous exchange rate and banking crises.  
 
The rise in international interest rates as a consequence of the tightening in the monetary 
policy adopted by Paul Volcker, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, in the early 1980s, 
forced Mexico, where a somewhat similar process of liberalization cum real exchange 
rate appreciation had also been in place, to default on its external debt. Mexico’s 
decision accentuated the already ongoing crisis in Argentina and triggered those in 
Uruguay and Chile. But it also deteriorated the external stance of the rest of LATAM 
countries, substantially increasing their foreign debt burden. The new international 
context of credit rationing and the subsequent attempts at closing the external and fiscal 
gaps particularly hit public and private investment, severely undermining the growth 
prospects of Latin America as a whole. The 1980s became known as the ‘lost decade’ 
for the region as a whole. Throughout that period per capita GDP decreased in all 
countries, with the only exception of Chile and Colombia.  
 
The neoliberal view, then already prevailing, attributed the failure of the liberalization 
attempts of the late 1970s to the incomplete nature of their reforms. Therefore, under the 
increasing influence of this view on the region’s elites and policymakers, a second and 
broader wave of market-friendly structural reforms began to take shape in the late 
1980s. The leverage achieved by the IFIs in LATAM countries as a result of their 
lending support and, consequently, their growing influence over their economic 
policies, also contributed to the dawning of this second wave. According to their 
advocates, the (relative) success of the Chilean experience, allegedly based on fully 
orthodox economic policies, was the example to be followed by the rest of Latin 
America. In the early 1990s, when the region regained access to international financial 
markets, the second round of market-friendly reforms, fuelled by large capital inflows, 
became unstoppable. 
3  The Washington Consensus period 
In the 30 years or so that spanned from the crumbling of the ISI strategy to the present, 
Latin American’s economic decline dramatically intensified. Economic performance 
was among the worst in the world, exhibiting amazingly high macroeconomic volatility, 
recurrent and deep disruptions and a dismal record in terms of long-run growth 
(Figure  7) and income distribution. As was already mentioned, a first attempt at 
replacing the already useless ISI model by a market-based development strategy took 
place in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Twin fiscal imbalances in the public accounts 
and the balance of payments, an unsustainable growth in domestic and foreign   10
indebtedness (both public and private) and the increasing fragility of domestic banking 
systems throughout the region were the main outcomes of this early attempt. The 1982 
Mexican default and the ensuing debt crisis put an end to this process when voluntary 
financing to the region virtually disappeared. Most LATAM countries spent the ‘lost 
decade’ squeezing domestic absorption to transfer real resources abroad, while a 
feasible solution to the debt crisis was recurrently postponed. 
Figure 7: GDP growth 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on ECLAC and IMF statistics. 
 
The mainstream view among scholars and policymakers blamed the halfhearted and 
incomplete nature of the reforms undertaken during the liberalization process of the late 
1970s for its failure. The proper answer to the breakdown of the first attempt was 
therefore a second and broader wave of market-friendly structural reforms. This second 
round began to take shape in the late 1980s under the umbrella of the debt relief 
provided by the Brady Plan and gained momentum when the region recovered access to 
international financial markets in the early 1990s. Because of the support of the USA 
government, as well as the Washington DC IFIs, the blueprint of the reform process   11
became known as the Washington Consensus.6 The list of recommendations contained 
in the Washington Consensus blueprint was this time far more ambitious than the one 
that had guided the 1970s reforms. Outright trade and financial liberalization were once 
again at the core of the strategy. This time, however, widespread market deregulation 
and the privatization of SOEs made also part of the strategy. Moreover, to prevent 
financial liberalization from generating undesired volatility, the domestic banking 
system was to be strengthened by the adoption of stricter prudential regulations and, 
when possible, the lifting of barriers to foreign bank participation. To be sure, the scope 
and progress of the reform process varied from country to country depending on their 
initial economic conditions and other traits of their institutional and social environment, 
but the Washington Consensus ideas strongly influenced economic policies and 
performance throughout the region. 
Figure 8: Public debt (as % of GDP) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on public information of each country. 
 
A stable macroeconomic environment was vital to carry out the proposed reforms. 
Therefore, fiscal discipline and sound money were two basic tenets of the Washington 
Consensus agenda. In this regard, the change in the institutional framework of monetary 
policy was seen as a major move in order to keep at bay political pressures, enlarge 
Central Bank autonomy and deprive politicians and bureaucrats from the conventional 
mechanism of printing money. The underlying idea was simple: if the government was 
denied access to central bank credit, it would then be forced to balance the budget by 
 
                                                 
6 Williamson (1990).   12
Figure 9: Real effective exchange rate (average 2000=100) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on IMF statistics. 
 
streamlining public expenditures and/or reforming the tax system and improving tax 
collection. The transitory funding required during the completion of fiscal reforms was 
to be provided by the privatization of loss-making public enterprises. In the same vein, 
the partial or full privatization of the pension system was aimed at consolidating the 
intertemporal solvency of the public sector.  
 
In most cases, however, the idea did not work well. In practice, political populism was 
not that easy to eradicate. Politicians and public bureaucrats managed to substitute 
foreign indebtedness for central bank funding. Easy access to international financial 
markets allowed many governments in the region to circumvent fiscal discipline. For 
several counties the cost was the growth of unsustainable public indebtedness 
(Figure 8). As already mentioned, trade liberalization was one of the crucial pillars of 
the 1990s reform. Its main goals were to increase efficiency in resource allocation, 
eliminating the anti-export bias present in import tariffs, and to help fight inflation by 
imposing market discipline on domestic firms that had behaved as price-makers in 
rather imperfectly competitive environments for decades. 
 
With only a few exceptions (Chile, Colombia), however, Latin American trade 
liberalization was not only fast and deep, but it was simultaneous to financial 
liberalization and exchange rate based stabilization policies. In the context of pegged or 
quasi-pegged exchange rate regimes, massive foreign capital inflows strongly biased 
relative prices and profitability against tradable sectors and in favor of non-tradable   13
goods and services.7 Price increases in public utilities that came along with 
privatizations also worked in the same way. As a result of the peculiar combination of 
simultaneous trade and financial liberalization with overvalued real exchange rates, 
most Latin American countries experienced a significant deterioration in their trade 
balances and large deficits in their current accounts (Figures 9 and 10). The progressive 
rise in interest payments and dividend remittances tended to accentuate those deficits. 
Foreign direct investments, attracted by privatizations and some other business 
opportunities, covered part of the current imbalances, but the main bulk of the deficit 
had to be financed by public and private external indebtedness (Figure 10). 
Figure 10: Current account balance and external debt (as % of GDP) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on ECLAC and IMF statistics. 
 
To be fair, the market-friendly strategy was initially successful in bringing down 
inflation. In several countries it also attracted significant flows of foreign direct 
investment (although privatizations were by far the main driver) and encouraged a more 
dynamic and diversified export performance. Basic infrastructure and the provision of 
public services did improve as well (Ocampo 2004). Nevertheless, without any kind of 
compensating policies to assist economic sectors in distress, the structural 
transformation that took place in LATAM economies had critical consequences on 
employment, income distribution and social welfare. Moreover, given the increasing 
external vulnerability and financial fragility of the region, when growing distress in 
                                                 
7 The policy mix involved accepting a high risk, to the extent that trade liberalization demands a higher 
real equilibrium exchange rate, while unrestricted capital flows and the fixing of an overvalued nominal 
exchange rate in countries which are structurally net capital importers, tend to keep the real exchange rate 
below its equilibrium level.   14
international financial markets triggered sudden stops in capital inflows, they caused 
severe financial and currency crises in most Latin American countries, interrupting 
economic expansion abruptly and forcing several governments to unilaterally 
renegotiate or even default their foreign financial obligations (Calvo 1998). Mexico 
(1994-95), Argentina (1995), Brazil (1998-99) and again Argentina (2001-02) probably 
experienced the largest crises, but only a few countries remained unaffected by this 
trend. As mentioned by Frenkel (2003), some common factors can be found in all the 
crises: 
•  pegged or quasi-pegged exchange rates regimes;  
•  overvalued real exchange rates;  
•  unrestrained capital movements;  
•  large capital inflows during economic expansions, both as a proportion of 
monetary aggregates and relative to the size of domestic financial markets; and  
•  weak supervision and inadequate regulations in the banking system. 
 
In the appalling context of the Latin American economic performance of the last 
decades, Chile stands out as a remarkable exception. After the failure of its first 
liberalization attempt in the late 1970s, its economic achievements over the last twenty 
years, both in terms of growth and poverty reduction, were presented by the supporters 
of the Washington Consensus approach as evidence of the success of the market-
friendly development strategy when properly implemented. In fact, however, the 
attempt to portray the Chilean experience as a success of the Washington Consensus 
approach is, to say the least, an oversimplification. To be sure, in line with Washington 
Consensus recommendations, Chile dramatically improved its fiscal and monetary 
stance. Also, it widely opened its economy to trade and extensively deregulated its real 
and financial domestic markets. Moreover, its privatization programme was one of the 
most ambitious in the developing world.  
 
However, and despite its rhetoric, the Chilean economic policy complemented its 
orthodox approach with several measures that were not included in the Consensus 
blueprint. In particular, the country never privatized CODELCO, the public copper 
enterprise, a major source of foreign exchange and public revenues. It also combined its 
unilateral reduction of import tariffs with an active policy of export incentives and a 
successful strategy of bilateral trade negotiations aimed at diversifying its foreign 
markets. The other distinctive element of the Chilean economic policy since the late 
seventies and until very recently was its clear commitment with the maintenance of a 
competitive real exchange rate. This goal was accomplished by adopting a crawling peg 
regime complemented, when necessary, with capital controls to discourage short-term 
inflows. It was only a few years ago that Chile decided to lift capital controls and switch 
to a flexible exchange rate regime. To conclude this brief comment on the Chilean case, 
it is worth stressing that, in sharp contrast with most of the LATAM countries, a strong 
institutional framework and an efficient public administration provided a strong backing 
to the effectiveness of economic policy.   15
Summing up, as happened during the ISI period, the two common elements that 
seriously undermined the overall outcome of the Washington Consensus experience 
were: (1) the failure of the state to play its required role, that in this case was to properly 
supervise and complement the role of markets; and (2) the inability to substitute a 
mature integration into the globalize world economy, properly balancing risks and 
opportunities, for the previous excessively inward orientation of the ISI period. The 
omnipresent public sector of the ISI period was replaced by a state that did not fulfill its 
most basic duties. The extreme protectionist policies of the past were replaced by 
completely unrestricted trade and financial liberalization.  
 
The unproven notion that privatizations would automatically induce a dramatic 
improvement in systemic efficiency and productivity contributed to minimizing the 
attention paid to the way in which privatizations were carried out. In several cases this 
approach prevented the development of truly competitive markets in the privatized 
activities while, at the same time, made it easier for both public officials and private 
agents to engage in corrupt practices. Other basic regulations were also missing, 
including effective anti-trust regulation, consumer protection and adequate prudential 
supervision on banking and private pension funds. Moreover, the need to establish a 
social safety net to alleviate the inevitable social and economic hardships of the 
structural transformations was overtly neglected.  
 
The reduced presence of the state in the regulation of economic activities, however, was 
not enough to curb the expansionary fiscal behavior of the past. The idea that the 
complex political economy issues that shape public sector performance could be easily 
managed by limiting the government’s access to central bank credit was at best naive. 
Beneath the surface, this approach failed to modify the deep determinants of public 
sector profligacy, which remained basically unchanged. As a matter of fact, the deeply 
ingrained populist practices of Latin American politicians and public bureaucrats were 
not eliminated by the reforms. Instead, when those politicians and bureaucrats found out 
that their old source of financing was no longer available, their immediate reaction was 
to look for a new one. The easy access to foreign financing prevailing in the 
international capital markets until the late 1990s solved their problem: the issuance of 
public debt substituted for the inflation tax. 
 
Indeed, despite the allegedly neoliberal inspiration of the reforms, in this area the policy 
course followed in most LATAM countries throughout the 1990s could be best 
characterized as neopopulist. Quite paradoxically, by disregarding the role of the state in 
a market economy and reducing public sector reform to the privatization of public firms, 
the Washington Consensus rhetoric helped preserve the status quo in the workings of 
the public sector. 
 
The second element that contributed to shaping the final outcome of Washington 
Consensus reforms has to do with the relationship established between stabilization   16
policies on the one hand, and trade and financial liberalization on the other. 
Stabilization policies mainly chose the exchange rate as nominal anchor. 
Simultaneously, with the full support of multilateral institutions and the establishment 
of industrialized countries, the USA in the first place, Latin America embarked on a 
process of outright trade and financial liberalization. As mentioned before, the speed 
and depth of trade liberalization deepened the overvaluation of the domestic currency 
associated with the use of the exchange rate as nominal anchor. The combination of 
overvaluation and liberalization dramatically altered relative prices and triggered a 
sharp transformation on the real side of the economy. At the same time, the sudden 
change in relative prices generated a competitiveness gap that helped to raise the current 
account imbalance. External adjustment was postponed because a growing foreign 
indebtedness provided the funds required to finance the persistent current account 
deficits. As a result, Latin American economies became not only less competitive but 
also more vulnerable to the volatility of world financial markets (Rozenwurcel 2003). 
 
The risks posed by the mix of a stabilization policy based on a pegged exchange rate 
and a simultaneous trade and financial liberalization were hardly unknown in the region. 
The Southern Cone’s dismal experience with trade and financial liberalization in the 
1970s had been extensively discussed in the sequencing literature of the 1980s. The 
need to carefully consider the timing of stabilization and liberalization in the goods and 
financial markets was one of the main lessons arising from that discussion (Fanelli et al. 
1992). Therefore, one can only conclude that policy mistakes were not the only reason 
behind the inconsistent implementation of stabilization and liberalization. The interests 
of powerful economic players that benefited from the new scenario despite its social 
costs certainly played a significant role in the process. There is nothing surprising in this 
fact. What is less understandable is the support given to this process by the multilateral 
institutions and other participants in the Washington Consensus. 
4  Where does Latin America stand now? 
After the Great Depression and throughout the rest of the twentieth century, LATAM 
countries have basically approached economic development following two successive 
and quite opposed strategies. The first one was import substitution industrialization. The 
second was the so-called Washington Consensus approach. While the two views were 
founded on quite opposite premises, neither the ISI nor the Washington Consensus 
managed to deliver sustained economic development to LATAM countries. External 
difficulties notwithstanding, two domestic elements are crucial to understand the 
breakdown of the ISI strategy in Latin America. One was the failure of the state to work 
as an engine of growth. This was so because of the large inefficiencies of SOEs, the 
government’s inability to appropriately combine sticks and carrots in its relationships 
with private firms, and the use of populist policies as the main redistributive device. All 
this not only induced chronic fiscal deficits and short run macro instability, but 
undermined overall productivity and long run growth as well. The second factor was the   17
extremely inward orientation of industrialization induced by extended and protracted 
protectionism, which prevented LATAM economies from taking advantage of foreign 
markets as a disciplining mechanism to gradually enhance the competitiveness of 
domestic firms.  
 
The strong social coalition supporting the status quo, including industrial firms, 
benefiting from captive domestic markets and public subsidies, industrial workers, 
favoured by low prices of food staples and utilities, and public bureaucrats, taking 
advantage of the power given by the discretionary channelling of public funds, 
prevented the progressive transformation of ISI into an export-led industrialization 
strategy as was the case in East Asia. A first attempt at replacing the ISI model by a 
market-based development strategy took place in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The 
1982 Mexican default and the ensuing debt crisis abruptly put an end to this process 
when voluntary financing to the region virtually disappeared. The neoliberal view, then 
already prevailing, attributed the failure of the liberalization attempts of the late 1970s 
to the incomplete nature of their reforms. According to this view, the proper answer to 
the breakdown of the first attempt was therefore a second and broader wave of market-
friendly structural reforms. This second round began to take shape in the late 1980s and 
gained momentum in the 1990s. 
 
The structural transformation that took place in LATAM economies under the 
Washington Consensus did not deliver its promises either. Not only was their long-run 
growth performance even worse than under ISI, but huge wealth and income 
inequalities accompanied their poor growth record. Moreover, the increasing external 
vulnerability and financial fragility of the region resulted in severe financial and 
currency crises in several Latin American countries. As happened with the ISI strategy, 
the two common elements that seriously undermined the overall outcome of the 
Washington Consensus experience were, first, the failure of the state to play its required 
role, that in this case was to properly supervise and complement the role of markets and, 
second, the inability to substitute a mature integration into the globalized world 
economy, properly balancing risks and opportunities, for the previous excessively 
inward orientation of the ISI period. Nevertheless, practically all countries in Latin 
America have experienced a significant recovery in the last couple of years. In 2004, in 
a context of remarkable macro stability, the region as a whole grew almost 6 per cent, 
the highest rate in the last 25 years (see Figure 7), and it is expected that growth will be 
around 4 per cent in 2005 and 2006. If this performance materializes, the regional per 
capita GDP would increase 10 per cent between 2004 and 2006. 
 
While it is true that growth resumption has been favoured by positive external 
conditions, it is also true that LATAM countries seem to have learned a few lessons. In 
fact, thanks to more flexible exchange rate regimes, growth in the region has been 
fuelled by significant increases in exports. Instead of generating current account 
deficits, therefore, this time economic expansion has been accompanied by current   18
account surpluses. Moreover, governments are taking advantage of this favourable 
situation to improve their fiscal stance and reduce public indebtedness ratios. Foreign 
debt ratios are also declining and country risk premia are close to their historical lows. 
 
Will this new scenario become sustainable? In order for this to take place LATAM 
countries have yet to consolidate the newly acquired macro stability, increase their 
investment ratios and dramatically reduce poverty and improve social equity. While 
current international conditions are positive, several uncertainties are present and it 
would be foolish to bet on the indefinite permanence of current trends. Therefore, the 
region has still to find its own way to take advantage of the opportunities created by 
economic globalization (adding value to its exports and diversifying their composition 
and destination, or attracting FDI towards dynamic sectors among other initiatives), 
while at the same time protecting itself from its negative effects. In this regard, 
designing effective countercyclical macroeconomic policies, as well as capital-flow 
regulations (particularly considering the role of these flows on LATAM’s business 
countries) is crucial. Moreover, LATAM countries need to find their own mix of market 
incentives and state intervention consistent with economic development under their 
specific circumstances. The fact that the emergence of dynamic economic activities is 
not necessarily an endogenous outcome of liberalized markets alone needs to be 
acknowledged. Rather to replace the private initiative, public policies should aim at 
fostering linkages between the most dynamic firms and sectors and the rest of the 
economy.  
 
Finally, social objectives should be mainstreamed into economic policy. The benefits of 
economic growth will not trickle down spontaneously to the less favored groups in 
society. Besides fostering democracy, institutional development and the quality of their 
political systems, LATAM counties will have to build proper safety nets and put into 
place efficient redistributive policies in order to achieve this goal. 
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